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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

INTRODUCTION

1. In my most recent report to the Security Council on 1 July 1993 (S/26026), I gave a detailed account of my efforts since early this year, in particular to reach agreement on confidence-building measures related to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport.

2. I reported on the extensive preparatory work undertaken in Nicosia with the leaders of the two communities between mid-April and mid-May. I described the nearly 50 hours of discussions with both leaders which gradually resulted in draft papers concerning the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport, as well as a draft paper containing a list of 14 confidence-building measures. I mentioned that it had been the wish of the two leaders to concentrate the joint meetings beginning on 24 May in New York on the confidence-building measures, in particular those related to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport.

3. I described the considerable effort that was made during the joint meetings in New York to further adjust the proposed arrangements on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport in order to take account in particular of the views expressed by Mr. Denktaş. I referred to Mr. Denktaş's insistence on leaving New York for consultations in Nicosia and Ankara and to his undertaking, stated on 1 June 1993 in the presence of the President of the Security Council and the representatives of its permanent members, to use his visit to Cyprus and Turkey to promote acceptance of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package and to resume the joint meetings in New York on 14 June.

4. I reported that after Mr. Denktaş's return to the area it soon became apparent, his previous undertaking notwithstanding, that it was not his intention to support the proposed arrangements he had discussed in New York. While in Nicosia and Ankara, Mr. Denktaş expressed strong criticism of the package and announced that he would not to return to New York. In response I had issued a public statement on 12 June expressing my regret that Mr. Denktaş had departed unilaterally from the agreement that had been reached on 1 June and that in the light of this new and regrettable development it had not been possible to pursue the effort in New York to reach an agreement on the package.

5. In my report of 1 July I also reiterated my conviction that agreement on the package would be followed before long by significant progress on the substance of an overall settlement and said that I would therefore persevere in my efforts to reach such an agreement and that I would send my Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark, to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. However, I expressed the fear that if we did not achieve an agreement on the package, the effort to reach an overall settlement would suffer a major setback.

6. After the Security Council considered my report, the President of the Council wrote to me on behalf of its members on 7 July (S/26050) to convey their full support for my current efforts; their agreement with my assessment that the implementation of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package would not only significantly benefit both communities, but would also have a dramatic impact on overcoming existing mistrust and in facilitating an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem; that they shared my disappointment that Mr. Denktaş had not yet adhered to the agreement of 1 June; and that they shared my conviction that once the package was fully presented, its significant benefits would be recognized. The members of the Council underlined the obligation of both parties to cooperate fully with me in arriving, in the first instance, at an agreement on the proposals related to Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. Finally, I was requested to submit a report on the outcome of my efforts to reach an agreement on these proposals and, if necessary, to make recommendations for action by the Security Council.

I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MY LAST REPORT

7. My efforts of the past two months have been devoted to an attempt to give effect to the unanimous position of the Security Council that an early agreement should be reached on the package of confidence-building measures related to the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package. To this end, my Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative were in Cyprus from 13 to 18 July where they held several meetings with the leaders of the two communities. They also met, on both sides, with the leaders of the main political parties, of the key business organizations and with many other persons from the media, academia and other professions. They then visited Athens on 19 and 20 July where they met with Prime Minister Mitsotakis, and Ankara on 21 and 22 July where they had meetings with Prime Minister Çiller, Deputy Prime Minister İnönü and Foreign Minister Çetin. On 23 July, my Deputy Special Representative returned to Cyprus where he had further discussions with the leaders of the two communities.

8. In the meetings with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, my Special Representative recalled that the focus on the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package had been the specific choice of the two leaders. He underlined that this package offered significant benefits for both communities. He stressed that efforts to reach an agreement on this package had to be pursued to a positive conclusion if a serious setback to the overall effort was to be avoided. He called on Mr. Denktaş to submit without further delay any technical questions he might have on the package.

9. The discussions with the leaders of the two communities did not reveal any change in their respective positions:

- Mr. Clerides reaffirmed that the Greek Cypriot side was agreeable to the provisions proposed for Varosha and Nicosia International Airport, provided that no provisions were added that would have the effect, directly or indirectly, of recognizing the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus";

- Mr. Denktaş repeated the criticism of the package which he had expressed following his return to the area in early June. He again said that the part of the fenced area of Varosha north of Dhimokratias Street must remain with the Turkish Cypriot side and that all embargoes would have to be lifted from all air and seaports in the northern part of Cyprus. Mr. Denktaş referred to the deep political division that existed within the Turkish Cypriot community which he maintained prevented him from fulfilling effectively his functions as negotiator. It was because of this internal problem that the questions about the package which had been announced earlier had not been submitted. This domestic problem would have to be resolved by elections which he hoped would take place in November. It would be difficult for the process to move forward until then.

10. The meetings with the Turkish Cypriot political party leaders and some 60 businessmen representing three business organizations in the northern part of Cyprus proved revealing. Several key conclusions emerged:

- Inaccurate and incomplete information had been presented on the impact of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package on the Turkish Cypriot people and economy. As a result there was considerable confusion among Turkish Cypriots about the package;

- Turkish Cypriots looked to Turkey for guidance in deciding on the package. Whereas Turkish leaders were to express to my Special Representative their support for the package, this had not yet been conveyed to the Turkish Cypriot leaders and people. This had contributed to a significant extent to existing uncertainties and their difficulties in deciding their attitudes to the package;

- There was widespread interest in the package among Turkish Cypriots and a desire to consider it seriously. They raised many questions which they wished to have answered.

11. In the meetings with Turkish Cypriot party leaders and business organizations, Mr. Clark welcomed the interest expressed in the package by a broad segment of the Turkish Cypriot community. He noted that many of the questions that had been asked reflected the inaccurate and incomplete information that had been provided about the package. He indicated the readiness of the United Nations to respond fully to their questions so that the Turkish Cypriot community could decide on the package on the basis of its true merits.

12. In the meeting in Athens, Prime Minister Mitsotakis was briefed on the discussions in Nicosia. The Greek leader expressed his full support for the package and for the position adopted by the Greek Cypriot side.

13. In the meetings in Ankara, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were informed of the discussions in Nicosia, in particular those with the Turkish Cypriot side. The important conclusions that had emerged, as described in paragraph 10 above, were described. Mr. Clark reaffirmed that the United Nations was ready to answer all legitimate questions which Turkish Cypriots might wish to raise so that they could decide on the package on the basis of its merits. He stressed that all questions they might have should be put forward without further delay. The Turkish Cypriot community was looking to Turkey for guidance and Turkey could and should play a key role by informing the Turkish Cypriot community of its positive position on the package.

14. The Prime Minister and the other Turkish leaders reaffirmed their own, as well as their country's, full support for the package. They said that the Turkish Cypriots were aware that Turkey supported the package and that the ultimate decision had to be taken by them. They agreed that all questions the Turkish Cypriots might have should be submitted without further delay. They referred to the current political problems in the Turkish Cypriot community which they felt could only be resolved through an election. They had urged the Turkish Cypriots to hold this as soon as possible and certainly before the end of 1993. But efforts to reach an agreement on the package would inevitably be slowed down until after the election.

15. Mr. Clark underlined the danger of a significant delay in reaching an agreement on the package. This would not only jeopardize the confidence-building measures, but would also be a serious setback for the effort to reach an overall settlement. He reiterated that the Turkish Cypriots were looking to Turkey for guidance and that any questions which the Turkish Cypriots might have about the package should be cleared up without further delay. He again stressed the important role which Turkey was expected to play in the process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.

16. Following the visit to Ankara, my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Feissel, returned to Nicosia where he had three further meetings with each of the two leaders. In his meetings with Mr. Denktaş, he again emphasized that any questions Mr. Denktaş might have on the package should be submitted without further delay. Mr. Denktaş again declined to provide any questions, attributing his inability to do so once again to the political conflict within the Turkish Cypriot community. However, Mr. Denktaş recognized that this should not prevent the United Nations from addressing the Turkish Cypriot concerns since the questions had in fact been presented informally in the various meetings with political and business leaders.

II. OBSERVATIONS

17. As is unfortunately evident from the above account, it has not been possible to make progress towards an agreement on the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package. In the letter of the President of the Security

Council of 7 July, the members of the Council underlined the obligation of both sides to cooperate fully and without delay with me to reach promptly, in the first instance, an agreement on the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package (S/26050). I am obliged to report that the Turkish Cypriot side has not yet shown the goodwill and cooperation required to achieve an agreement on the package. Its campaign of disinformation has been contrary to the undertaking by Mr. Denktaş on 1 June to promote acceptance of the package.

18. At the same time it is encouraging that in the Turkish Cypriot community there exists widespread interest in the package and a desire to consider it seriously. Addressing the questions raised by the political and business leaders would provide a means of shedding light on its full scope so that a decision can be taken on its merits.

19. In addition, the Government of Turkey's reiteration of its full support for the package must be followed up by a concrete effort to make the Turkish Cypriot community aware that this is the Turkish Government's position. I very much hope that during the coming weeks I will receive more active support from Turkey.

20. As part of my continued efforts to achieve agreement on the package, I propose to send a team of senior experts to Cyprus in early October for about a month to address fully the questions that have been raised concerning the effects of the package, including those relating to the economic imbalance between the two communities. The team will include economists whose expertise will encompass development issues, international trade, customs matters and free trade zones, as well as tourism and civil aviation experts. I have asked the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to assist me in assembling this team. The result of the team's work will be discussed with all concerned and will be made public so that the ramifications and benefits of the package are fully understood by all concerned.

21. I have also asked the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Administrator of UNDP to assist me in sending a team of civil aviation experts to Cyprus as soon as possible to assess the technical requirements for reopening Nicosia International Airport. The team will undertake a thorough examination of the current condition of the airport and identify all requirements for making it operational.

22. I shall convey the outcome of my efforts during the coming two months, including the results of both teams' work, to the Security Council in the report which the Council, in its resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, requested me to submit by mid-November.

23. As the members of the Security Council have underlined in the President's letter of 7 July (S/26050), time is of the essence. It is not possible to continue the current effort indefinitely. An agreement on the package should have been concluded by now. Unfortunately, for the reasons explained in the present report, this has not been possible. It is essential that I should receive the cooperation and active support of the Turkish Cypriot side. I have also emphasized in this report the important role Turkey can and should play in helping to achieve objectives endorsed by the international community. If my current efforts do not succeed soon, my mission of good offices will be

seriously undermined. In such an event, I would have to invite the members of the Council to consider alternative ways to promote the effective implementation of its many resolutions on Cyprus.